Introduction
This paper tests the hypothesis that persons included under the U.S.
Federal Estate Tax rainiraize taxes paid on their personal asset transfers; or to express the same point somewhat differently, that donors equalize true bequest and gift tax rates on their transfers.
A series of studies culminating in a monograph by Shoup (1966) have shown beyond a doubt that the nominal bequest tax rate has regularly exceeded the nominal gift tax rate, and this has been a persistent puzzle. A reconciliation between our main thesis and this undeniable finding must then rely on a distinction between true and nominal rates of transfer tax.
In fact, the paper takes the principal source of difference to be the favored income tax treatment of unrealized capital gains in estates compared to gifts. Hence, according to this hypothesis the nominal excess of the bequest tax rate is due to equalization of the true rates.
Organization of the paper is as follows; section 2 briefly presents the theory of transfers which predicts tax rate equalization; section 3 derives formulas for the true tax rates and a condition based on rate equalization which the share of unrealized capital gains in transfers must satisfy; section A estimates all tax parameters which enter these formulas; section 5 uses the equalization condition for unrealized capital gains to compare the predicted value with the value estimated from stock price data, and offers a statistical test of the congruence; section 6 predicts the effects of removing the favoring capital gains treatment of bequests; and section 7 briefly concludes the paper.
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A Theory of Personal Asset Transfers
The utility of the testator (hereafter donor, to emphasize the choice between giving and bequeathing) is assumed to depend separably on the con sumption of Che donor and the utility of his recipients {on the separability literature, see Strotz (]957, 1959) , Gorman (1959) , and Goldman and Uzawa (1964) }. The fact that the donor aggregates recipient consumption implies a planning horizon extending over their combined life spans. In the presentation it is assumed that maximization with respect to the underlying commodities has already been carried out, so that utility is a function of prices and expendi tures, and the branch utility function for individuals (known as specific satisfaction functions in the separability literature) are written similarly.
Therefore, all utility functions are indirect {on the concept of the indirect utility function see Houthakker (1952) }. According to the above assumptions, the donor's utility function can be written as U= U{Vj, ( Cj^), Vjj ( Cjj)},
where is the donor's (indirect) satisfaction function, which depends on his consumption alone, the are prices of the commodities he consumes, and is the present value of his lifetime consumption. Counterpart variables with subscript R stand for recipients, except that is the utility function of K recipients.^depends only on consumption of recipients. Discounted recipient This assumption rules out any question of control over recipients, since there is no ground for conflict so long as net transfers are non-negative, A related analysis encompassing distinctions among recipients is feasible and is carried out for purposes of certain special applications in Adams (1976) . so that the donor acts as a residual supplier of wealth to his recipients.
Given positive transfer taxes and other causes of rising price, the donor spends more than recipients get, or in other words gross transfers (T^^) exceed net (To). Gross transfers are defined by
where P , = average price of giving a dollar in the ith period through the kth mode of transfer.^Given rising prices. > 1. Net transfers are defined by
The donor eicpends his wealth (Wj^) on his own consumption (Cj^) and gross transfers (T^), so
The nature of the maximizing process is then as follows: the donor maximizes utility (1) subject to his budget (5); however, transfer taxes and other influences create a difference between the amounts expended and the amounts received, when it comes to setting the optimal level of recipient consumption Cj^.
Net amounts enter the satisfaction function through substitution of (2) and (4) into (1), while gross amounts enter the budget line, through substitution of (3) into (5). The donor's consumption decisions are only fully defined when 2 Examples of modes of transfer might be education embodied in the young, versus gifts of land or common stock to them.
(1) is maximized subject to all of equations (2) In the following model of gift and bequest assets, it is assumed that undervaluation through tax evasion is the same for gifts and bequests.
Where E = value of marginal estate, and b = marginal bequest tax rate, marginal estate tax is B=bE.
Estates are assumed to yield Income perpetually, and the marginal estate less bequest taxes (E -B) provides the yield (Y^) so
where r = rate of yield on gifts and bequests. Income taxes per period are a fraction t of the yield, where t Is the marginal Income tax rate. Hence
4 The comparison between true tax rates Is direct and not related through a discount factor. Only estate taxes require discounting, not estate tax rates.
Under the perpetuity assumption, their capitalized value is T e » t(l-b)E.
(11) r True net estate (E) is the value of the estate (E) less bequest taxes (B) and the capitalized value of the income tax (Te/r), so
The true marginal estate tax rate (x) is the proportional difference between value of marginal estate (E) and true net marginal estate (E), or
tl A related procedure is followed for gifts. Where g is the marginal gift tax rate and G the value of the marginal gift, the marginal gift tax
The tax base for gifts is more complicated than for bequests, since unrealized capital gains yG (where y is the share of unrealized capital gains) will comprise a source of taxable income, in addition to ordinary income. If the marginal gift net of the gift tax (G-V) is traded in evenly over the planning horizon at a rate which approximately exhausts the gift, it will be traded at rate r.^The per period tax (T^) is the sum of the tax on the ordinary income component and the tax on unrealized capital gains, or
We have^~where the approximation enters through the fact that trading need not continue indefinitely. The assumption about turnover of gift assets is meant to represent its central tendency. An additional approximation used in all the formulas is constancy of the income tax rate through time.
where r(l-g)G is the yield on gifts net of the gift tax and ryG is the value of gifts in unrealized capital gains traded in each period. The tax rate on the first component is assumed to be t, and t/2 on the second.^Income taxes capitalized are
The true net gift (G) is defined as the value of the marginal gift less all taxes, or
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The true gift tax rate (p) is defined as the proportional difference between 7 the gross and true net values, or
Equation (15) assumes that capital gains are taxed at h the rate on ordinary income. Note also that it correctly assumes that gross gift is taxed under the capital gains tax.
This computation assumes that t <.50, since strictly speaking, unrealized capital gains are only taxable at a rate equal to^the ordinary rate up to a maximum of 25 per cent. If t^.50, the formulas for p must be revised to read: p = g+t(l-g) +|.
(18)'
This implies that the expression for the predicted Y becomes:
However, for data based on means,'t as the marginal income tax rate will probably not exceed .50, and therefore the expressions in the text have been used in the empirical work. For example, suppose that gifts and bequests are completely spent within the period in which they are received. This is the most extreme decumulation assumption possible. Then (assuming income on estates and gifts is yielded at the close of each period) no income taxes are yielded by estates, so that T = b, while the only income taxes on gifts are levied on y, so p = g + t 2
Hence if T = p, y* = 2(b-g Estimates of marginal bequest and gift tax rates require some computations.
In Table 1 The federal tax credit is partly a deduction for state death taxes paid. See Shoup (1966) , pp. 83-85, for an example of the computation. In 1962, these credits amounted to $205 million, bringing before credit state taxes to $594 million. Note that after credit concepts of both state and federal taxes cannot be simultaneously eiiq)loyed.^S ee U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Finances, Details of State Tax Collections in 1963 Collections in (1964 12 Blinder (1974) , p. 44 documents this for the case of California, where rates rise from 2% to 10% on bequests to minor children, and from 10% to 24% on bequests to unrelated persons. The figures shown are approximations to the marginal tax rate because of the structure of the gift tax. The current year*s rate of gift tax is determined by the present year's taxable gift and accumulated taxable gifts from previous years. Subtraction of current year and lifetime exemptions and charitable deductions yields figures which summed constitute accumulated taxable gifts.
Even were the progressive rate component sizable, computation of the average rate would be preferable to assuming a zero state tax rate, though the tax rate would be underestimated.
'^For example, the gift data in the Treasury 1957 and 1959 Special Study is Incomplete and unreliable. This is due to donor migration from one filing district to another, and the difficulty of combining the records of the different district offices. Variant A is the sum of the before credit marginal rate of the federal tax (.357) and the after credit average rate of the state taxes.
Variant B is the sum of the after credit marginal rate of the federal tax (.351) and the before credit average rate of the state taxes.
The low estimate uses Economic Estate as the tax base for state taxes, ' yielding .024 as the rate after credits, and ,037 as the rate before credits.
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The high estimate uses Disposable Estate as the tax base for state taxes, yielding .054 as the rate after credits, and .084 as the rate before credits. Gift tax divided by gift tax plus taxable gifts. The gift tax is computed on the basis of the gift net of taxes (Taxable Gifts), Thus the marginal gift tax rate is g/l +• g. Hence current year taxable gifts plus the gift tax are divided into the gift tax. See Shoup, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, P. 15. Therefore, since taxable gifts of the current year are an increment to gifts of past years, and taxes are also incremental, the computed tax rates may be said to be roughly marginal. 
Comparison of Predicted and Estimated Unrealized Capital Gains Shares
Inserting the estimated tax rates from the preceding section into equation (19), a range of predicted unrealized capital gains shares is created. These are presented in Table 4 . The reason for the variation, given the use of point estimates, derives from the uncertainty which surrounds the mean federal estate -18-tax rate, the much more important uncertainty concerning the base of state death taxes, and an assumed range of variability in the federal gift tax rate bounded approxitoately by the highest and lowest rates appearing in Table 3 .
Thus the predicted share of unrealized capital gains ranges from #3^to .54, with .44 a middle estimate.
Estimated shares of unrealized capital gains were derived based on stock price data, and the calculations of David (1968) and McClung(1966) . The estimated shares were further adjusted for estate and gift composition and the effects of taxes on composition.
The primary source of information utilized regarding the share of assets in unrealized capital gains is David (1968) . Two other studies contained deficiencies which David tried to correct in his own work. In McClung (1966) , trading of assets is assumed to be independent of past appreciation and the past holding period biasing the share of realized gains upward, and the share in unrealized gains (y) downward, the latter of which is estimated at .40.
In Bailey (1969) The reader should be warned that the computations of all researchers in this area have been necessarily crude and are subject to error. Some of the difficulties are discussed in the Appendix of the paper. A/V is calculated as (V-0)/V. McClung*s is the only study known to me which takes account of assets passing out of existence, and hence is able to compute original value 0. Notice that while McClung's estimate of y = U/V is subject to criticism, the figure for A/V is not, because the division of gains between realized and unrealized is irrelevant for the comparison. The main problem with McClung*s estimate is that the asset data are not fully matched with David's difficulty in this analysis is that y for estates may be expected to exceed the value derived from general stock-price calculations even on supposedly comparable assets. Donors have an incentive to delay until death the transfer of assets which have the highest proportional appreciation. However, a separate estimate of y for estate assets is not available. Thus, the above reasoning would suggest a wider gap between marginal tax rates than that predicted by any available point estimates of y though the importance of the difference is not easy to evaluate. The true tax rate formulas suggest that Disposable Estate and its composition are the relevant measures of bequest. However, data on estate composition, once taxes and indebtedness have been deducted, are not availabe. Limits for the share of disposable estate in equities can be obtained through the following argument. Cash and other liquid holdings are bequeathed, more than other assets, in order to discharge debts, expenses, and taxes. Hence, the minimum estimate of the equity asset share is the unadjusted 72% figure for taxable Gross Estate. The maximum estimate (actually an overestimate) can be made by assuming that the maximum possible amounts in liquid assets for the tabulated brackets are used to discharge cost items. Therefore, if the percentage in liquid assets exceeds the percentage in cost items, the difference is taken as the residual per cent; if the percentage of liquid assets is the smaller 18 of the two, the residual per cent is assumed to be zero. This is an upper bound, because intra-class variation in estate composition makes some of the cancelling impossible, and actual behavior may differ from attributed behavior. Deducting all cost items from total gross estate, and dividing this figure into total residual liquid assets yields an 11% proportion. The maximum share of equity assets is therefore 18 Table 6 shows a falling share of liquid assets as the proportion of cost items rises with the rising average tax rate. However, time is granted for pajnnent of the estate tax in order to avoid a liquidity problem. Thus the falling share of liquid assets is not inconsistent with the interpretation in the paper. liquid assets consist of bonds, mortagages and notes, cash, life proceeds, and annuities.
i n s u r a n c e Expenses consist of executors' coxmnissions, attorneys' fees, other expenses, and funeral expenses. In view of the foregoing, the expected share of unrealized capital gains in bequests can be bounded on the one hand by the product of the high estimates of the equity share of unrealized capital gains and the equity share in estates, and on the other, by the low estimates. would appear that the existence of a capital gains share for the typical stockholder would have been sufficient to account for the 1962 divergence in transfer tax rates. This conclusion presumably applies to other years as well. 19 The proportion of equity assets in Gross Gifts is somewhat higher than for Gross Estate in 1962 -83% as opposed to 72%, However transfer taxes are a smaller fraction of Gross Gifts than Gross Estates, and also the expenses associated with death -residual debt, funeral expenses, and various commis sions -do not pertain to gifts. Therefore Gross Gifts more closely approximate Disposable Gifts than Gross Estate does Disposable Estate, and the equity fraction should be higher. In view of the above, the share of equities in each transfer appears to be nearly the same. 20 These remarks presupposse that marginal composition does not differ appreciably from the average. The question may also be raised why gifts occur in appreciating assets rather than in cash. The answer must be that trading in these assets would cause the donor to pay capital gains taxes plus additional transactions costs at least as high as the capital gains taxes which would have been payed by recipients. Therefore there is no advantage in this maneuver. Source: Statistics of Income, Gift and Estate Tax Returns, years 1958 , 1960 , 1962 kind.
The one-sided P-value, or minimal level of significance at which the 22 null hypothesis of identical y distributions can be rejected, is P = .732.
Hence, there is no significant difference observed in the two y distributions.
A Prediction
The possibility of repealing the estate tax provision favoring unrealized capital gains is now under discussion. Since the repeal would offer in the absence of offsetting changes^an experimental test of the theory exposited in section 2., it seems useful to outline the results expected from this analysis. In the comparison nominal bequest and gift tax schedules are held constant.
The strongest result from the theory does not require any ceteris paribus conditions other than constancy of all other tax provisions. Nominal estate and gift tax rates will conveirge, and indeed become equal if it is literally true that
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The Median Test assumes data points taken from two samples to be independent and applies Fisher*s 2X2 Exact Test to sample observations cross-classified by subsample and whether they exceed or fall short of the median of the combined sample.
For an exposition, see Brownlee (1965) , pp. 246-247. The present application uses all ten data points from Tables 4 and 8.   22 This holds for a hypothesized difference of the estimated y from the predicted "y in either the positive or negative direction. One-sided P -values were also calculated for alternative marginal income tax rates of t = .40, t = .45, and t = .55. These were found to be P = .024, P = .262, and P = .732 respectively. The calculation for t = .40 illustrates a small sample flaw in the test which is apparently inevitable, for a significance level lower than .024 is not possible even in this case, where all estimated y values lie below the median. This problem disappears as the total number of observations increases, in any application of the test.
there are no differential factors remaining which affect gift and estate transfers.
Equalization is an implication of equation (19), which ignores all other sources of differential treatment.
This conclusion follows from the fact that real rates in the initial position favor gifts after repeal, and from the implication of the theory that no advantage can persist.
Less strongly, at any given wealth of the donor, definite directions of change are imparted to the gift and estate tax rates. The nominal bequest tax rate 23 falls, and the nominal gift tax rate rises. These effects can be overturned if accompanied by independent growth in wealth, since all transfers and nominal tax rates would increase if price effects of the repeal were overcome by wealth effects.
Conclusion
This paper has shown how formal incorporation of the differential income tax treatment favoring bequests over gifts can explain the excess of the nominal bequest tax rate over the gift tax rate, using published aggregate data. The usual caveats concerning realiability of estimates apply with special force to the calculation of the unrealized capital gains share, a matter discussed in somewhat more detail in the concluding Appendix. In addition, matched data on gift and bequest tax rates were not available, so observed tax rates based on the behavior of unmatched persons in the gift and bequest samples were utilized in their place. Matched data would provide a more accurate test of the principal 23 With equilibration of differentials in marginal transfer prices, the increase in the common marginal price is less than the exogenous increase in the bequest price permitting reallocation of transfer components towards gifts, and reduction of total net transfers in response to the higher common price at the reallocated former level. This implies that bequests fall, and with imperfect substitution against total net transfers, the rise in the common price implies an Increase in gifts. Income Tax Returns, either as given or crudely adjusted upward for underreporting.
The underreporting factor was a constant applied to all years, though derived from 1959 and 1961 data alone. The estimated realized gains were then adjusted downward for all years by another constant factor, the ratio of realized gains on corporate equities to all realized gains in 1959. This is because realizations apply to the whole spectrum of assets. The cumulated difference in accruals and adjusted realized gains is an estimate of all unrealized capital gains. It is not an estimate of unrealized taxable gains, and more In^ortant, it is not an estimate of unrealized taxable gains in estates. The basic reason Is that the calculated gains treat assets as if they had never turned over through bequest. Computations of the revised minimal y based on the above fractions reveals a range of y from 31% to 40% as compared to text values of 39% to 51%, though again most of the difference in tax rates is accounted for. In addition the two factors mentioned above lead to an underestimate, as well as unrealized taxable gains in general expected to be larger than the average observed on stocks.
Finally, David (1968, p. 78) presents evidence indicating that capital gains shares on stocks, real estate, and own business equities were quite similar for traded assets in 1959 and 1961, which is the justification for the similar treatment of these assets in the estate data.
